We present results from a hypothetical framed field experiment assessing whether risk preferences significantly differ across the health and financial domains when they are elicited through the same multiple price list paired-lottery method. We consider a sample of 300 patients attending outpatient clinics in a university hospital in Athens during the Greek financial crisis. Risk preferences in finance were elicited using paired-lottery questions with hypothetical payments. The questions were adapted to the health domain by framing the lotteries as risky treatments in hypothetical health care scenarios. Using maximum likelihood methods, we estimated the degree of risk aversion, allowing for the estimates to be dependent on domain and individual characteristics. The subjects in our sample, who were exposed to both health and financial distress, tended to be less risk averse in the financial domain than in the health domain.
W e report the results from a hypothetical ''framed field experiment'' in accordance with Harrison and List 1 (i.e., an experiment with nonstudent subjects making decisions in a field context) of 300 patients attending outpatient clinics in a Greek hospital during the current economic crisis. We elicited their risk preferences within both the financial and health domains using the multiple price list (MPL) paired-lottery method of Holt and Laury 2 (HL) with hypothetical payments, and we tested the hypothesis that risk preferences differ across domains.
This research was motivated by the need to test different methods of measuring risk preferences in health. Despite previous attempts, 3, 4 there is currently no ''gold-standard'' metric for risk preferences in health. In addition, the evidence on how risk preferences correlate across the health and financial domains is scant. Very few risk preference measures have been tested in health care settings with real patients.
Testing different measures of risk preferences in health and across domains is of key interest for research and policy purposes for 3 main reasons. First, it may allow a better understanding of how patients make health care decisions and adhere to them. Second, it may contribute to the validity of cost-effectiveness analyses and decision-making models where risk preferences are considered. Third, direct evidence on the tradeoff of risks across wealth and health sheds light on the willingness to enroll in voluntary health insurance.
In this study, we explored the possibility of measuring risk preferences in finance and health using the MPL method. Together with the Binswanger 5, 6 and Gneezy and Potters 7 methods, the HL MPL method is one of the most widely used incentivecompatible (IC) methods to measure risk preferences over monetary outcomes. In this method, subjects were asked to choose the option that they prefer in a series of pairs of lotteries involving different riskoutcome tradeoffs. We used the HL MPL method with hypothetical, rather than IC, rewards and calculated risk preferences in finance and health within subjects.
We did so by considering subjects attending outpatient clinics in a hospital in Greece during the current economic recession. Such subjects found themselves within a ''naturally occurring'' state of both financial and health distress. This context improved the likelihood of respondents perceiving the risky tradeoffs as realistic and vivid even in the absence of actual IC consequences for their responses. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to elicit the risk preferences of a relatively large pool of subjects (n = 300) in both the financial and health domains using the same MPL paired-lottery measure. Our main finding is that risk preferences differ across the health and financial domains even when they are elicited through the same MPL measure: our sample of Greek patients manifested higher risk aversion in health.
BACKGROUND
The issue of whether preferences are stable is a central question among economists, psychologists, and ''applied behavioral scientists'' (per Kahneman 8 ) . Preference stability tends to be assessed at 2 levels: over time and across different domains in life at a given point in time. a Our research relates to the latter. There are 6 main approaches to measure risk preferences in health. The first approach uses insurance (INS) market choices to infer underlying risk preferences. [16] [17] [18] A few recent articles have looked at choices across different insurance contracts to assess risk preferences across different life domains. 19, 20 A second approach uses ''risky'' health behavior such as smoking, heavy drinking, or not using seat belts as indirect proxies for risk preferences. In this behavior proxy strategy, which has been widely used, [21] [22] [23] risk preferences are indirectly inferred from observed behavior rather than being directly measured. A third approach assumes that risk taking is inherently domain specific and should therefore be measured by domain-specific questionnaires such as the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale, the Risk Propensity Questionnaire, and the Risk Propensity Scale. [24] [25] [26] Although domain-specific measures may be constructed to address health behaviors, 27,28 a disadvantage of this approach is that risk preferences are not directly measured but are inferred from self-reported engagement in risky behaviors. The fourth approach, a simplified variant of the third, is based on self-assessed willingness to take risk generally and in specific domains using Likert scales. 29 This scale-based self-assessed (SB-SA) approach is simple, and scores can be quantitatively compared across domains. However, the theoretical foundations of this direct scaling approach are unclear, 3 and evidence on how the SB-SA scores correlate with other risk preference measures and across different domains is mixed. [29] [30] [31] Two common features of approaches 2, 3, and 4 are that 1) they are not IC, in the sense that the measures are merely hypothetical and they bear no real consequences to subjects, and 2) they involve purely self-reported scale measures rather than explicit tradeoffs.
The fifth approach encompasses a family of methods that measure risk preferences in health with tasks involving explicit tradeoffs rather than self-reported a Economists often distinguish between ''unconditional'' and ''conditional'' stability of risk preferences. 9 ''Unconditional'' stability postulates that risk aversion literally remains constant over time. According to ''conditional'' stability, however, what remains constant over time is the function that links the risk aversion with the observable states of nature. Conditional stability, a weaker concept of the stability of preferences, is actually common among economists, who also refer to it as ''state-dependent preferences.'' 10, 11 There are very few studies looking at the stability of preferences over time for representative samples of the population (e.g., Andersen and others 9 and Harrison and Lau 12 in Denmark). Other studies have typically looked at shorter time horizons, 13 relatively small numbers of repeated observations, 14 and/or very specific, not representative, pools of subjects. 15 scales. b Within this tradeoff approach, a common method is the certainty-equivalent (CE) method. 3, 4, 32 Of direct interest here, Prosser and Wittenberg 4 elicited the CE in both health and money lotteries for patients with multiple sclerosis and members of the general public. The proxy for risk preferences is the value of the CE, defined as the smallest amount of dollars or relapse-free days that the respondent would be willing to accept instead of the lottery presented. Both groups of respondents were significantly risk averse for small and large monetary outcomes but risk neutral with respect to health outcomes. Similar results were obtained by Warshawsky-Livne and others. 33 CE questions have also been included in surveys such as the US Health and Retirement Survey, with mixed evidence on their links with other risk preference measures and with risky health behaviors. 34, 35 Other methods within this tradeoff approach are the probability-equivalent (PE) method, which is also at the heart of the standard gamble method commonly used to measure utilities of health states, and the gamble tradeoff (GTO) method. 3, 36 The final approach to measure risk preferences in health uses IC tests involving real rewards to respondents. Similarly to what has been found in other areas, experimental economists have documented a ''hypothetical response bias'' in the elicitation of risk preferences, with hypothetical methods showing significantly less risk aversion than methods with real rewards. 2, [37] [38] [39] [40] Since measuring risk preferences in health with real health consequences is challenging, most studies employing IC methods offer monetary rewards, rather than health rewards, and compare elicited risk preferences to health behaviors, again with mixed results. 30, [41] [42] [43] The 3 most common IC measurement procedures for risk preferences for monetary outcomes are the ones proposed by Binswanger, 5, 6 Gneezy and Potters, 7 and Holt and Laury 2 . 44 The HL method uses an MPL design that presents a series of questions, each reproducing a choice between 2 lotteries. 2, 45 The HL MPL method fully accounts for an individual being risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking, whereas the other 2 IC methods cannot empirically distinguish between risk neutrality and risk seeking. A second major advantage is that the HL method allows the researcher to structurally estimate the underlying risk preferences. In particular, the behavioral econometrics approach by Harrison and Rutström 46 and Andersen and others 47, 48 uses maximum likelihood (ML) to estimate the risk aversion parameters, assuming a range of expected utility theory (EUT) and non-EUT models (see Supplementary Appendix A).
In Table 1 , we summarize the key studies that compare risk preferences across different domains. We briefly report their design; the methods; whether the rewards were hypothetical or real; the compared domains; their samples and settings; and their main findings, in particular, whether they found consistent risk preferences across different domains. Not only is there a broad range of methods used in the literature, but also the evidence of risk preference stability across domains is mixed. Most studies have used hypothetical rewards, and few used either IC tests or actual INS choices. Among the hypothetical tests, the CE method was most common, while the HL MPL method prevailed among the IC methods. With the exception of Wakker and Deneffe 3 and Harrison and others, 49 most studies used a withinsubjects design, with a broad heterogeneity of domains across which risk preferences were compared. Results are difficult to compare due to the high heterogeneity of samples, methods, and study designs. However, for the studies using either the MPL or INS approach, there is general evidence that there are differences across domains and that these also emerge when real consequences are at stake.
The approach undertaken in the present work aims to bridge the gap between the fifth and sixth approaches. As with the sixth approach, we used the MPL method and structurally estimated the risk preferences across the domains. On the other hand, similarly to the fifth approach, we considered only hypothetical rather than real rewards. This was mainly due to the ethical and logistical constraints from operating in our outpatient clinic settings as well as the intention to minimize confounders across the 2 domains. Our study is methodologically close to the approach by Riddel, 50 who compared risk preferences across the financial and environmental domains using the HL MPL method with hypothetical rewards.
METHODS

Setting
The study took place in the outpatient clinics of Laiko General Hospital in Athens, Greece, where one of the authors (CS) had previous research b A comprehensive methodological discussion of these various tradeoff approaches to measure risk preferences can be found in Wakker and Deneffe. 3 Here, we only briefly review the key tradeoff approaches applied to risk preferences in health. Notice that all the tradeoff methods mentioned here can be IC when applied in measuring risk preferences for monetary outcomes. Although not expected when the study was designed, the period of 14 months of data collection was a time of intense economic and political distress for Greece. A series of severe austerity measures were undertaken earlier that year (April 2010) when the country's deficit reached 12% of the gross domestic product. In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund and the EU agreed on the first bailout loan to Greece. In June 2011, the Greek parliament voted a new austerity bill, which included severe spending cuts and tax increases, while in October 2011, a second bailout loan was agreed upon. The austerity measures were followed by a series of strikes, violent riots, and political instability. c Thus, the economic crisis gradually deteriorated during the months of data collection. For instance, the unemployment rate was 13.4% in September 2010 and increased gradually to 20.2% in October 2011. 51 Although a number of reforms were introduced in health care, free access to outpatient clinics was not affected during the months of data collection. d
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Design
In the present study, we opted to not use IC payment mechanisms for 4 main reasons. First, the idea of implementing IC outcomes related to risky choices in outpatient clinics encountered resistance from the hospital's Research Ethics Committee. So, in order to secure ethical approval for the project, tests had to be hypothetical. Second, implementing real payments for the chosen lotteries within the financial domain, while making the outcomes within the health domain only hypothetical, clearly implies the introduction of a confounding factor that would hinder the attribution of the observed differences in choices to the different domains. 50 Third, from a methodological perspective, we aimed to road test the extension of the HL MPL method in measuring risk preferences in domains other than money and to contribute to bridging the gap between IC tests for risk preferences with money (the HL MPL approach) and hypothetical tradeoff methods typically used to measure risk preferences in health (the CE, PE, and GTO approaches). Finally, opting for hypothetical payments makes our results closely comparable with the previous findings by Wakker and Deneffe, 3 Prosser and Wittenberg, 4 and Dohmen and others, 29 who also looked at risk preferences in money and health by comparing hypothetical responses to GTO, CE, and SB-SA tests, respectively.
Sampling
So that the respondents would perceive the risky tradeoffs as realistic and vivid even in the absence of IC consequences for their responses, we approached a pool of subjects who found themselves within a ''naturally occurring'' state of both financial and health distress and presented them with tests within a field context and with naturalistic stakes. Our sample consisted of real patients attending outpatient clinics in a hospital in Greece during the current economic recession. We assumed that these subjects are naturally exposed at the same time to both finance-and health-related risks. The 2 sources of field risks are different in nature, at least according to the distinction between ''foreground'' and ''background'' risks discussed by Harrison and others. 49 Given the field setting where subjects were recruited, the health risk associated with visiting a hospital clinic can be considered a ''foreground'' risk, while the financial crisis is a ''background'' risk.
Furthermore, recruiting our sample in a clinical setting renders it more likely that subjects are apprehensive about the state of their health compared to that of their finances. Thus, in this sample, subjects likely are more risk averse in health than in money, which would not hold in other contexts.
We targeted a sample size of 300 patients. We recruited patients from all outpatient clinics where patients were reasonably affected by health conditions characterized by only moderate pain or discomfort, anxiety, or distress according to the EQ-5D classification. 53, 54 When recruiting, we approached all patients while they were waiting to see their doctors in the outpatient clinics of the hospital between 9 AM and 1 PM. Research assistants simply mentioned that the questionnaire was a study conducted by a university. Interviews were conducted roughly c For a self-contained timeline of the Greek economic crisis during the period of data collection, see http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline. d For a more specific discussion of the policy measures in the health care area during the economic crisis, see Petmesidou and others. 52 equally across all working days of the week and all morning hours. We reached the final target of 300 patients by approaching 386 patients in total, corresponding to a response rate of 78%. In order to reach the target sample, 4 different rounds of data collection were needed: September 2010 (round 1, lasting 5 weeks; n = 91), January 2011 (round 2, lasting 4 weeks; n = 34), April 2011 (round 3, lasting 5 weeks; n = 56), and October 2011 (round 4, lasting 4 weeks; n = 119).
Questionnaire
Patients who agreed to participate were given a questionnaire, which took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Patients were given both verbal and written instructions. The research assistant sat next to them, clarifying issues regarding the experimental tests and making sure that respondents clearly understood the questions.
The first part of the questionnaire assessed sociodemographic variables (e.g., age, sex, education, income bracket), individual lifestyle and health habits (e.g., self-assessed health, health behaviors), and psychological traits (e.g., overconfidence). In the second part of the experiment, we elicited individual risk preferences.
The questionnaire was developed in English and was linguistically validated in Greek following the guidelines on cross-cultural adaptation. 55, 56 It was first tested among 32 patients from the same population (see Supplementary Appendix B). The responses from this pilot were not included in the final analysis.
Framework
We assumed that risk preferences are elicited within the EUT framework for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) individual. 2, 9, 45, 57 : the utility function of a subject in the financial domain, in terms of monetary payoffs W, is thus
where r w is the coefficient of CRRA in finance. Subjects' risk aversion can be grouped into 3 main types: 
Eliciting Risk Preferences
We used the same MPL method 2,3,45-48 to elicit risk preferences in both finance and health. Each subject was asked 2 sets of questions, first in finance (question Q1.11 in Supplementary Appendix C) and then in health (question Q1.13 in Supplementary Appendix C). The pilot study, in fact, suggested that the lotteries were easier to understand if presented in finance first. Presenting the financial lotteries before the health ones makes the test directly comparable with the analogous design by Prosser and Wittenberg. 4 Such a design feature of our study, however, does not allow us to explicitly account for possible order effects of responses across different domains (see Supplementary Appendix B). The questionnaire also included intertemporal questions, which are not analyzed here.
In each set of risk preference questions, patients were asked to choose between 2 risky options (lotteries): A and B (Tables 2 and 3 ). In the 9 pairs of risky options in either set, we varied both the probabilities P kj and the payoffs associated with each outcome k = 1,2 of the 2 lotteries, either in monetary (W kj ) terms or days in full health (H kj ) terms, with j = A,B. The probabilities varied from 0% to 100%, while the payoffs varied from e10 to e385 in the financial domain. Subjects could not manifest indifference between the 2 lotteries.
To elicit risk preferences in health, we framed the financial paired-lottery method in terms of health rewards while keeping the structure and all other features of the MPL elicitation test unaltered in order to allow for comparability across domains. Therefore, the lotteries were presented as pairs of different health care treatments characterized by some risk. e As an extension, we have also considered risk preferences within the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model by Quiggin. 58 RDU is a generalization of EUT that allows subjects to transform the objective probabilities presented in lotteries and to use these weighted probabilities as decision weights in the evaluation of the lotteries. In particular, we have considered the power probability weighting function w(p) proposed by Quiggin, 58 which is defined over a unique curvature parameter y: w(p) = p y . When y 6 ¼ 1, the RDU model deviates from the EUT model: the concavity and convexity of w(p) are said to reflect the optimism and pessimism, respectively, in how a subject perceives objective probabilities. The rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) from a 2prize lottery in health, for instance, can be written as RDEU = [w(p(H 1 ))*U(H 1 )] 1 [(1-w(p(H 1 )))*U(H 1 )], where w(p) = p y . In footnote 14 j , we briefly report the results obtained under RDU.
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The health care context was chosen to ensure a vivid and realistic representation of the hypothetical alternatives by patients attending outpatient clinics and is fully in line with the choice between 2 surgical procedures by Wakker and Deneffe 3 and 2 drugs by Prosser and Wittenberg. 4 Participants were told that each treatment in the pair of options was expected to provide some amount of health benefits with some probability and a lower amount of health benefits with the complementary probability. Analogously to the financial domain, one treatment (lottery A) was presented as being characterized by a smaller difference between health benefits than the risky treatment (lottery B), and the series of pairs of treatments only differ with respect to the probabilities of occurrence for the higher health benefits. Concerning the exact nature of health benefits, the natural candidate for the equivalent of an extra unit of money in the health domain was an extra unit of ''time in full health.'' f Importantly, by considering patients in hospital clinics, who were by definition not yet ''satiated'' in their level of time in full health, we ensured that a lottery in health providing an extra unit of time in full health was perceived as associated with a strictly positive benefit by all subjects. To emphasize this, we also made it clear that, once the effects of the health Table 3 Set 1  10  200  90  160  10  385  90  10  A  B  2  20  200  80  160  20  385  80  10  A  B  3  30  200  70  160  30  385  70  10  A  B  4  40  200  60  160  40  385  60  10  A  B  5  50  200  50  160  50  385  50  10  A  B  6  60  200  40  160  60  385  40  10  A  B  7  70  200  30  160  70  385  30  10  A  B  8  80  200  20  160  80  385  20  10  A  B  9  90  200  10  160  90  385  10 10 A B
of Choices between Binary Lotteries Given to the Patients in the Health Domain
Note: The specific instructions for this item are reported in question Q1. 13 in Supplementary Appendix C. Note: The columns with the EVs for the lotteries and the implied CRRA ranges were not shown to the subjects in the field experiment. The implied CRRA ranges presume that, for every gamble before the switching pair, lottery A is preferred and, for every gamble after the switching pair, lottery B is preferred. The specific instructions for this item are reported in question Q1.11 in Supplementary Appendix C. CRRA = constant relative risk aversion; EV = expected value; HL = Holt and Laury; MPL = multiple price list.
f This is consistent with the conceptual framework of cost-utility analysis in which health benefits are typically evaluated relative to the benchmark of a unit of ''time in full health,'' whose benefit in terms of utility is usually standardized to 1. In the monetary domain, this closely corresponds to standardizing the utility of a unit of income/ money to 1. The choice of time in full health as the natural equivalent metric of money in the health domain is also in line with Wakker and Deneffe 3 and Prosser and Wittenberg. 4 treatments ended, subjects would go back to the health status that they initially had. This is analogous to the stimuli used by Prosser and Wittenberg. 4 
Comparing the Finance and Health Domains
The implicit conversion rate between domains was e1 per day in full health. The choice of the conversion rate was based on evidence from the pilot experiment run with a sample of patients from the same hospital having similar characteristics to the respondents in our experiment. The assumption of the one-to-one conversion rate is key for the analysis (under both the EUT and RDU models) as it impacts cross-domain comparisons: a detailed discussion of the justification, methodological issues, and limitations associated with our conversion rate between domains can be found in Supplementary Appendix B.
Estimating Risk Preferences
To estimate risk preferences, we used ML methods and followed the econometric approach of Andersen and others 45, 47, 48 and Harrison and Rutströ m, 46 in whose studies the full details of the empirical strategy can be found. g A self-contained discussion of the approach is provided in Supplementary Appendix A. We pooled all the observations and included a categorical variable (H) to control for whether the responses refer to the money (H = 0) or the health domain (H = 1). h As we collected 9 responses for each domain from 300 subjects, the resulting dataset comprised 5400 observations overall. We corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of observations within the same subject by treating the residuals from the same individual as potentially correlated and computing cluster-robust standard errors. In the model, the r parameter is a function of the domain (H), of the rounds of data collection, and of other observable individual characteristics. Besides the estimated CRRA coefficient r, the ML estimations report a ''noise'' (m) parameter, which reflects the individual 
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''errors'' in identifying the preferred lottery (as mentioned, indifference was excluded by design). Table 4 presents the definition and main descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis. We used sociodemographic variables to control for respondents' age (age), gender (female), marital status (married), level of education (educ), and self-assessed health (SAH) and for whether they have children (children). We used 2 economic variables: one showing the monthly income bracket to which the respondent belongs (income), and another indicating how constrained respondents feel by their current financial situation (finconstr). i As we pooled all subjects, the variables round 2, round 3, and round 4 control for the round when the questionnaire was collected, with the reference being round 1: 91 patients were interviewed in round 1 of data collection, 34 patients in round 2, 56 patients in round 3, and finally, 119 patients in round 4. The categorical variable H represents the domain in which the responses to questions on risk preferences are elicited. The main question is whether the domain variable H is statistically significant.
Variables and Descriptive Statistics
RESULTS
We first present the coefficient of risk aversion structurally estimated using all the data pooled across both domains (model 1 in Table 5 ). The estimated CRRA coefficient (r) is 0.0643 (95% confidence interval [CI], 20.0273 to 0.1560), not significantly different from risk neutrality. The fact that subjects exhibited overall risk-neutral preferences is broadly consistent with the view that the use of hypothetical elicitation methods can favor the observation of riskneutral over risk-averse responses. 2, [37] [38] [39] [40] When looking at the differences across domains, we found that our sample exhibited significant risk-averse responses in the health domain: while the overall estimated coefficient of risk aversion is not statistically different from zero (P = 0.169), the estimated coefficient for the health domain is 0.133 (95% CI, 0.0212-0.2455) and statistically significantly different from zero (P = 0.020), corresponding to a moderate degree of risk aversion (model 2 in Table 5 ). j When we pooled all data across both domains and controlled for the rounds of data collection (n = 91 in round 1; n = 34 in round 2; n = 56 in round 3; n = 119 in round 4), we found evidence of progressively more risk-seeking responses in models 3 to 5 ( Table  5 ) but not in model 7, which also controlled for finconstr (see below): responses were significantly more risk seeking in rounds 2, 3, and 4 compared to the first round of data collection. Risk preferences in the health domain remained statistically significantly more risk averse than in the finance domain (models 4 and 5 in Table 5 ). As shown by the lack of statistical significance of the interaction terms (except for a significant effect of round 3, n = 56), the cross-domain difference in risk preferences did not vary according to the degree of exogenous financial risk, while the effects of the rounds of data collection were still significant (model 5 in Table 5 ). k i The correlation between income and finconstr is negative and highly significant (P = 0.000) for the whole sample (20.2026) as well as for each round of data collection (20.2234, 20.3488, 20.3574 , and 20.2905 in rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). j As mentioned in footnote e , we have also estimated subjects' risk preferences under the RDU model using the power probability weighting function proposed by Quiggin. 58 The RDU estimations qualify the findings obtained for EUT and allow us to ''structurally decompose'' the part of the risk premium due to aversion to outcome variability (the r parameter) and the part due to probability weighting (the y coefficient). 12 First, the estimates of the y coefficient (y = 1.6338, with a robust standard error of 0.1249; P = 0.000) suggest that for subjects in our sample, the RDU model seems to be favored in comparison to EUT (under which y should not be significantly different from 1). Second, under RDU, subjects appear generally characterized by a more concave curvature of the utility function than under EUT (r = 0.3695, with a standard error of 0.0868; P = 0.000). Third, and in line with the risk preference patterns described above for EUT, the estimates of the health domain effect on the r coefficient indicate that patients in our sample are characterized by significantly more concave utility functions in health than in finance (H = 0.1983, with a standard error of 0.0912; P = 0.030). Finally, the estimates of the health domain effect on the y coefficient of the power function show that the probability weighting function is not statistically different across the 2 domains (0.1637, with a standard error of 0.1417; P = 0.248). k The same pattern of risk preferences at different rounds of data collection emerges when looking at the raw responses of subjects in terms of ''switching points'' between lottery A to lottery B in the 2 sets of questions. In the MPL tests, in fact, the later the respondents switch to lottery B, the more risk averse they are. Notice that, in contrast with what is often documented in laboratory experiments, in our sample, virtually no subject switched more than once across lotteries in each block of questions. This was mainly due to the fact that, in our experiment, research assistants sat next to the patients and were trained to provide clear instructions and guidance to respondents. The raw responses of subjects interviewed in later rounds of data collection exhibited less risk aversion in both the finance and health domains. In finance, the average switching point was 5.7011, 5.1176, 4.6786, and 4.3675 in rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In health, the average switching point was 6.4934, 4.9687, 4.5647, and 4.2454 in rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The correlation between the switching points across domains is positive and significant (P = 0.000) for the whole sample (0.5136) as well as for each round of data collection (0.2905, 0.2287, 0.6529, and 0.7562 in rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). Moreover, subjects reported a higher degree of financial distress in later rounds of data collection: the average value of finconstr was 2.1428 in round 1, 2.3333 in round 2, 2.4347 in round 3, and 2.8271 in round 4. 
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Controlling for a range of sociodemographic variables showed no statistically significant association of the overall estimated risk aversion with observable characteristics except for the variable finconstr, which was statistically significantly associated with more risk-seeking responses (model 6 in Table 5 ). l The introduction of interaction terms between the rounds and the financial constraint status showed that the subjects who, in round 4, felt more uncomfortable with their financial situation reported more risk-seeking responses (model 7 in Table 5 ). m
DISCUSSION
The result that respondents in our pool were relatively more risk averse in health than in financial matters is in line with Wakker and Deneffe, 3 who found more risk aversion in health in their betweensubjects study. Our findings are also qualitatively in line with those of Blais and Weber 24 using the DOS-PERT scale and with the finding of Dohmen and others 29 that the respondents to the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) reported a higher willingness to take risks in finance than in health.
Our findings are the opposite of those found by Prosser and Wittenberg 4 : patients in their sample were risk neutral in health but significantly risk averse in finance. Besides obvious differences in the subject pools, as well as in the methods used to measure risk preferences, the different patterns in crossdomain risk attitudes could be due to the fact that our respondents were simultaneously exposed to both financial and health distress.
Both raw responses and estimated risk aversion parameters showed that respondents were more likely to seek risk if they were interviewed at later rounds of the study, when the recession worsened. This is generally in line with observations of the spread of risky behaviors among the Greeks during the economic recession. 60, 61 Our findings are the opposite of what is documented as ''countercyclical'' risk aversion (i.e., people taking more risks when the economy is growing): Cohn and others 62 found that Swiss financial professionals primed to a fictive chart of a booming stock market took higher risks in an IC assessment of risk preferences than subjects primed to a busting market. Guiso and others 63 found similar results from hypothetical risk preference questions in customers of an Italian bank before and after the 2008 crisis.
CONCLUSIONS
Our goal was to elicit risk preferences in the financial and health domains using the same MPL pairedlottery method. We considered a sample of Greek patients in the middle of an economic recession and found evidence that risk preferences may differ between the health and financial domains even when they are measured using the same MPL method. When exposed to both financial and health distress, our sample of Greek patients tended to be more risk averse in health than in finance.
From a methodological perspective, conducting the same MPL test with subjects in ''naturally occurring'' field situations of both financial and health distress can contribute to bringing closer together 2 streams of methods that have proceeded along distinct paths: on the one hand, IC experimental measures for risk preferences with real monetary stakes, and on the other, hypothetical tests in the health domain. Despite its key importance for both research and policy purposes, there is still no current ''gold standard'' to measure risk preferences in health or to compare them across different domains. 4, 26, 27, 64 Our review section is an attempt to bring closer together the different approaches and methods in this area.
The study has several limitations. In Supplementary Appendix B, we extensively discuss some of the limitations of our design, which include the following: sample selection due to recruiting patients in outpatient clinics; key assumptions on the EUT, the CRRA, the specific levels of the stakes, and the implicit conversion rate between e1 and 1 day in full health; possible order effects of asking subjects risk preference questions in finance first; and unknown interactions between the ''foreground'' and ''background'' risks as perceived by the subjects.
Furthermore, due to the constraints related to approaching patients in hospital clinics, we asked respondents to make hypothetical choices. There is evidence that responses to hypothetical questions l We have also estimated many alternative models and found, for instance, that in our sample, the estimated EUT CRRA coefficient of risk aversion is not statistically significantly associated with a range of health behaviors such as smoking (P = 0.182), drinking (P = 0.159), physical exercise (P = 0.983), having chronic conditions (P = 0.149), and psychological attitudes such as ''illusion of control'' (P = 0.285) or ''better than average'' overconfidence (P = 0.426). m When interpreting these results, it is worthwhile to recall that the finconstr variable captures self-reported feelings of being constrained by the financial situation. exhibit less risk aversion compared to IC methods. 2,37-40,65-68 A different experimental design (e.g., Blackburn and others 66 ) would permit an assessment of the extent of the above hypothetical bias and the recalibration of responses for this. More generally, the design and implementation of IC measures of risk preferences in the health domain are a challenging but promising area, and we envisage further research in more controlled experimental settings. An interesting question is related to whether the ''disciplinary power'' of IC tests is sufficiently strong to align responses on risk preferences across the 2 domains.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings have significant implications. Our results imply caution in using measures for risk aversion elicited in financial contexts to infer risk preferences in health domains. More studies on the validity of existing methodologies in assessing risk preferences across domains should be welcome. Another research area that warrants further investigation is whether within-subjects risk preferences are stable across different health-related contexts, such as preventive care or medical treatments, for instance.
The implications of our findings are not only of academic interest. The development of different metrics to measure risk preferences in health and to compare them with their monetary analogs can prove useful to enrich the validity of cost-effectiveness analyses and decision-making models in which they are incorporated. 69 More generally, accessing evidence on how risks are traded off across wealth and health helps in assessing the likelihood that people enroll in voluntary health insurance schemes and in estimating their willingness to pay for them. This is a key concern, as private insurance schemes will become increasingly important to increase the benefits of publicly funded universal health care coverage. Our results also provide useful insights for the design of policy interventions that affect decisions and behaviors spanning simultaneously across the financial and health domains, such as the design of financial incentive schemes to tackle risky behaviors in health. [70] [71] [72] [73] Finally, a deeper understanding of risk preferences in health allows for a better exploration of how patients make health care decisions, such as adhering to medical decisions and seeking a second medical opinion. 74, 75 In such decisions, a key role is typically played by the doctors whose risk preferences may be similar to, or different from, the patients', in a similar way to what has been previously documented in other contexts. 76 The exploration of this distinct question is left for further work. 77 
